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Abstract—Understanding the spread of false information in
social networks has gained a lot of recent attention. In this paper,
we explore the role community structures play in determining
how people get exposed to fake news. Inspired by approaches in
epidemiology, we propose a novel Community Health Assessment
model, whose goal is to understand the vulnerability of commu-
nities to fake news spread. We define the concepts of neighbor,
boundary and core nodes of a community and propose appro-
priate metrics to quantify the vulnerability of nodes (individual-
level) and communities (group-level) to spreading fake news.
We evaluate our model on communities identified using three
popular community detection algorithms for twelve real-world
news spreading networks collected from Twitter. Experimental
results show that the proposed metrics perform significantly
better on the fake news spreading networks than on the true
news, indicating that our community health assessment model is
effective.
I. INTRODUCTION
Use of social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter is
ubiquitous in modern times, making them powerful platforms
for news propagation and consumption. However, the good
inevitably is accompanied by the bad, which can be witnessed
by the problem of fake news spreading [1]. It spreads when
someone propagates it via endorsements such as replying,
sharing or re-posting, without validating its authenticity. There
is significant interest in understanding the nature of fake
news spreading. Our focus is on assessing the vulnerability
of social networks to fake news spreading. Specifically, we
focus on people and the communities they create, with the goal
of identifying how vulnerable individuals and communities
are to believing and propagating fake news. We propose
the Community Health Assessment model that distinguishes
between neighbor, boundary and core nodes of a community,
and propose novel metrics to quantify the vulnerability of
an individual node, as well as the community, to external
exposure. We propose methods to estimate the likelihood of
a boundary node of a community to believe fake news sent
from its immediate neighbors; and also estimate the likelihood
of a community’s entire boundary node set to believe fake
news coming from its neighborhood. It is important to note
that the method used to quantify vulnerability of a boundary
node can be generalized to any node. Intuitively, if an external
node infects a member of a community, the likelihood of
the entire community getting infected increases due to high
connectivity and trust among its members. Thus, while as-
sessing vulnerability of community, we focus on examining
the influence of news propagated from external nodes into
the community rather than considering the propagation of
the news within the community. We evaluate our model on
the propagation networks of twelve real-world news collected
from snopes.com1.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose the Community Health Assessment model
that introduces the ideas of neighbor, boundary and core
nodes for a community structure in a social network.
• We propose metrics to quantify the vulnerability of a node
and a community to fake news exposure from outside.
• Using Twitter news item spreading network (a subgraph
of Twitter network induced by the news item, news
network in short) we demonstrate that our proposed
metrics can assess the vulnerability of social networks
to fake news better than for true news.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been a recent surge in interest among researchers
and practitioners to develop approaches to prevent fake news
spread. Most approaches in the literature use content-based [2],
[3] and propagation-based characteristics [4], [5]. Approaches
using neural networks [6], [7] have also shown promising re-
sults. Infection spread models inspired from epidemiology [8],
[9] have also been used to model rumor spreading. Other
models have tried to identify the rumor spreading source [10],
[11]. A community perspective to rumor spread has also been
attempted. Fan et al. [12] proposed an approach to identify a
minimal set of boundary nodes that would prevent spread of
rumors from neighboring communities. Nguyen et al. [13] pro-
posed a community-based heuristic method to find the smallest
set of highly influential nodes whose decontamination with
good information would contain rumor spreading. Vosoughi
1https://www.snopes.com/fact-check-ratings/
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et al. [14] empirically analyzed the spread of true and false
news online, and is close to our research.
III. COMMUNITY HEALTH ASSESSMENT MODEL
Social networks comprise of communities, which are struc-
tures that are modular groups, where within-group members
are highly connected, and across-group members are loosely
connected. Modularity is the ratio of density of edges inside
a community to edges outside the community [15]. If such
communities are exposed to fake news being propagated from
neighboring nodes, the likelihood of the whole community
getting infected would be high. Thus it is important to identify
vulnerable communities that lie in the path of fake news spread
in order to protect them, and thus limit the overall influence of
fake news in the network. As part of the Community Health
Assessment model, we first propose the ideas of neighbor,
boundary and core nodes of a community, and then derive
metrics to quantify vulnerability of nodes and communities
based on the fundamental measures of trust.
The three types of nodes with respect to a community which
are affected during the process of news spreading are explained
below:
1. Neighbor nodes: These nodes are directly connected to at
least one node of the community. The set of neighbor nodes
is denoted by N . They are not a part of the community.
2. Boundary nodes: These are community nodes that are
directly connected to at least one neighbor node. The set of
boundary nodes is denoted by B.
3. Core nodes: These nodes are only connected to members
within the community. The set of core nodes is denoted as C.
A. Preliminaries
1) Trustingness and Trustworthiness: In the context of
social media, researchers have used social networks to under-
stand how trust manifests among users. A recent work is the
Trust in Social Media (TSM) model which assigns a pair of
complementary trust scores to each actor, called Trustingness
and Trustworthiness. Trustingness quantifies the propensity of
an actor to trust its neighbors and Trustworthiness quantifies
the willingness of the neighbors to trust the actor. The details
of the model are excluded due to space constraints and can be
found in [16].
2) Believability: Believability is an edge score derived
from Trustingness and Trustworthiness scores. It helps us
quantify how likely is the receiver of a message to believe its
sender. Believability for a directed edge is naturally computed
as a function of the trustworthiness of the sender and the
trustingness of the receiver. The idea has been applied in
[17] where a classification model was built to identify rumor
spreaders in Twitter network.
B. Vulnerability Metrics
Motivation: Fake news generally gets no coverage from
mainstream news platforms (such as press or television),
so the biggest factor contributing to a user’s decision to
spread a fake news on social media is its inherent trust on
Fig. 1: Illustration of vulnerability to fake news spread.
other users endorsing it. On the other hand, a user would
most likely endorse a true news since it is typically spread
from more credible news sources, such as mainstream media.
We hypothesize that the less credible nature of fake news
makes it much more reliant on user trust for spreading than
true news does. Thus, we propose our vulnerability metrics
based upon the idea of computational trust, particularly the
believability measure, for assessing the health of individuals
and communities encountering fake news.
Illustrative Example: We illustrate the idea of the pro-
posed vulnerability metrics through figure 1. Red nodes in
community C2 represent fake news spreaders. C1 and C3 are
two other communities having identical structure. C3 and C1
have 3 and 2 boundary nodes, respectively, that are directly
connected to the fake news spreaders. Based on edge count
one would believe that C3 is more vulnerable to fake news
spreading than C1. But low trusting boundary nodes of C3 are
connected to low trustworthy spreaders, while high trusting
boundary nodes of C1 are connected to high trustworthy
spreaders. Therefore, our metric should be able to identify
C1 as more vulnerable than C3.
While TSM has also been used to assess news organization’s
impact on audience engagement [18], we build upon the idea
of believability to propose Vulnerability Metrics that help us
quantify the likelihood of boundary nodes and communities
believing a news spread from their neighbors. We assume that
the news spreading is widespread outside of the community,
i.e., at least some of the neighbor nodes of the community
are spreaders. We define the node- and community-level
vulnerability metrics as follows:
Vulnerability of boundary node V (b): This metric mea-
sures the likelihood of a boundary node b to become a spreader.
The metric is derived as follows: The likelihood of node b to
believe an immediate neighbor n is a function of the trustwor-
thiness of the neighbor n (n ∈ Nb, where Nb is the set of all
neighbor nodes of b) and the trustingness of b, and is quantified
as belnb = tw(n)∗ ti(b), that is, Believability(n→ b). Thus,
the likelihood that b is not vulnerable to n can be quantified
as (1− belnb). Generalizing this, the likelihood of b not being
vulnerable to all of its neighbor nodes is
∏
∀n∈Nb(1− belnb).
Therefore, the likelihood of b to believe any of its neighbors,
i.e., the vulnerability of the boundary node b is computed as:




Vulnerability of community, V˜ (C): This metric measures
likelihood of the boundary node set of a community C (BC) to
believe a news from any of its neighbors. The metric is derived
as follows: Going forward with the idea in 1), the likelihood
that boundary node b is not vulnerable to its neighbors can be
quantified as (1− V (b)). Generalizing this to all b ∈ BC , the
likelihood that none of the boundary nodes of a community are
vulnerable to their neighbors can be quantified as
∏
∀b∈BC (1−
V (b)). Thus, the likelihood of community C being vulnerable
to any its neighbors, i.e., the vulnerability of the community,
is defined as:
V˜ (C) = 1−
∏
∀b∈BC
(1− V (b)) (2)
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Dataset and Setup
We collected twelve different designated news articles and
their ground truth ratings through snopes.com. Based on the
rating type, we categorized the news into three categories:
News M1, M2, M3 and M4 are labelled as Mixture which
indicates that the news has significant elements of both truth
and falsity in it, news F1, F2, F3 and F4 are labelled as False
which indicates that the primary elements of the news are
basically false, and news T1, T2, T3 and T4 are labelled as
True which indicates that the primary elements of a claim are
basically true. The general statistics for the twelve networks
are presented in Table I.
We identified the specific source tweet related to each news
in question. For evaluation of metrics, we then identified
all the spreaders of the source tweet associated with the
news, which comprised of the source tweeter (identified using
Twitter API) and the list of retweeters (accessible through
twren.ch). We considered the follower-following network of
the spreaders obtained from Twitter API, as the directed social
network. We ran the TSM algorithm [16] on this network to
compute the trustingness and trustworthiness scores for every
node. We then identified disjoint communities using three
popular community detection algorithms on large networks:
Louvain [19], Infomap [20], and Label Propagation [21]. For
each of the communities generated we identified the sets of
boundary and neighbor nodes.
B. Evaluation of Metrics
To measure how good the proposed metrics are able to quan-
tify the vulnerability of nodes and communities, we evaluate
the quality of ranking on boundary nodes and communities
based on vulnerability scores in comparison with the ground-
truth ranking of nodes and communities derived from the
news spread in the network. We adopt the ranking evaluation
measures widely used in Information Retrieval literature [22].
1) Evaluation of V (b): A vulnerable boundary node is
highly likely to have strong believability with its neighbors. We
thus consider the ground truth of a vulnerable node as a node
which retweets. The ground truth vulnerability of boundary
nodes is binary as we only have information of whether the
node retweets or not. We thus evaluate this metric using
Average Precision@k (AP@k, where k represents the top-
k vulnerable boundary nodes) and Mean Average Precision
(MAP) over all communities in a network.
2) Evaluation of V˜ (C): A community with more number
of spreader boundary nodes is more vulnerable to news
penetration. As most communities of a network have at least
few spreader boundary nodes, it is not feasible to use node
ranking metrics above for evaluating community vulnerability.
We thus rank the communities by their vulnerability scores and
compare with the ground-truth ranking given by the relative
count of spreader boundary nodes in the community. We use
Kendall’s tau (τ ), which is a correlation measure for ordinal
data, as evaluation metric.
C. Results
Table II shows the evaluation results for the proposed metric
assessing the vulnerability of boundary nodes. For the twelve
networks we show the Average Precision for k = 1, 3, 5, 10 and
15 and compute the MAP for the top-15 results. AP@1 shows
how well we are able to identify the first spreader boundary
node based on our metric. Our metric is able to identify the
most vulnerable boundary node in AP of 0.712, 0.91, 0.471 av-
eraged over mixture, false, true news networks respectively for
Louvain; 0.695, 0.923, 0.459 averaged over mixture, false, true
news networks respectively for Informap; 0.811, 0.915, 0.74
averaged over mixture, false, true news networks respectively
for Label Propagation. As expected, our metrics show better
performance particularly for fake news networks, followed
by mixture and then true news networks. Average precision
for rest of k also shows similar trend. Metrics for Louvain-
/Infomap-based communities follow a similar trend for the
remaining k values. However, Label Propagation communities
for k=3 and 5 show better performance on true news networks
compared to mixture news networks. This insensitivity in
evaluation could be attributed to the fact that label propagation
algorithm tends to generate more number of communities. We
also observe that the MAP shows a similar trend, with better
performance for false news networks compared to true news
networks.
Table III shows the evaluation results for proposed metric to
compute the vulnerability of a community. For the twelve net-
works the table shows Kendall’s tau value (τ) for communities
generated using the three algorithms. We observe that the τ
for mixture and true news networks tend to have a negative
correlation with the ground truth community ranking. False
news networks on the other hand show a positive correlation.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose novel metrics based on the concept of believ-
ability derived from computational trust measures to compute
vulnerability of nodes and communities to news spread and
show that the metrics are much more sensitive to fake news
than true news. This confirms our hypothesis that fake news
have to rely on strong trust among spreaders to propagate while
true news do not. Through experiments on large news spread
TABLE I. Statistics for the news propagation networks.
M1 M2 M3 M4 F1 F2 F3 F4 T1 T2 T3 T4
# of nodes in network 2,385,188 3,669,213 6,462,462 3,512,201 1,883,329 4,981,319 782,209 503,160 10,929,291 953,040 2,155,927 1,530,958
# of edges in network 11,684,879 7,054,734 10,621,364 6,108,311 16,658,841 12,625,672 12,498,122 7,797,449 14,933,611 1,250,463 3,221,985 2,484,553
# of spreaders 2,833 2,296 2,834 2,668 2,879 2,833 465 290 2,788 198 693 1,053
TABLE II. Evaluation of vulnerability of boundary nodes (L: Louvain; I: Infomap; LP: Label Propagation).
AP@1 AP@3 AP@5 AP@10 AP@15 MAP
L I LP L I LP L I LP L I LP L I LP L I LP
M1 0.759 0.676 0.712 0.770 0.567 0.523 0.736 0.548 0.519 0.606 0.543 0.533 0.661 0.505 0.566 0.672 0.546 0.555
M2 0.818 0.749 0.907 0.737 0.888 0.722 0.769 0.733 0.799 0.821 0.699 0.999 0.733 0.666 0.999 0.785 0.733 0.875
M3 0.805 0.642 0.878 0.620 0.595 0.784 0.567 0.509 0.749 0.590 0.512 0.674 0.524 0.586 0.833 0.596 0.577 0.751
M4 0.468 0.714 0.750 0.409 0.619 0.633 0.366 0.674 0.633 0.323 0.523 0.659 0.325 0.454 0.799 0.350 0.569 0.660
Mavg 0.712 0.695 0.811 0.634 0.667 0.665 0.609 0.616 0.675 0.585 0.569 0.716 0.560 0.552 0.799 0.600 0.606 0.710
F1 0.892 0.749 0.855 0.793 0.722 0.761 0.824 0.679 0.999 0.922 0.499 0.799 0.899 0.422 0.999 0.876 0.552 0.905
F2 0.819 0.999 0.874 0.657 0.777 0.851 0.727 0.499 0.839 0.741 0.399 0.924 0.706 0.266 0.999 0.714 0.518 0.900
F3 0.933 0.945 0.933 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.955 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.972 0.985 0.995
F4 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.955 0.999 0.999 0.979 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.991 0.999 0.999
Favg 0.910 0.923 0.915 0.862 0.874 0.902 0.865 0.794 0.959 0.901 0.724 0.930 0.900 0.671 0.999 0.888 0.763 0.949
T1 0.222 0.531 0.868 0.469 0.466 0.802 0.424 0.492 0.716 0.439 0.349 0.479 0.377 0.344 0.533 0.450 0.424 0.644
T2 0.548 0.374 0.482 0.407 0.238 0.666 0.299 0.399 0.999 0.049 0.299 0.699 0.033 0.033 0.466 0.173 0.264 0.726
T3 0.666 0.470 0.913 0.472 0.499 0.999 0.519 0.499 0.999 0.299 0.499 0.899 0.266 0.433 0.799 0.391 0.479 0.900
T4 0.449 0.464 0.699 0.371 0.666 0.541 0.399 0.000 0.479 0.409 0.000 0.499 0.362 0.000 0.366 0.399 0.106 0.500
Tavg 0.471 0.459 0.740 0.429 0.467 0.752 0.410 0.347 0.798 0.299 0.286 0.644 0.259 0.202 0.541 0.353 0.318 0.692
TABLE III. Evaluation of vulnerability of communities (L: Louvain; I: Infomap; LP: Label Propagation).
τM1 τM2 τM3 τM4 τF1 τF2 τF3 τF4 τT1 τT2 τT3 τT4
L -0.027 0.003 -0.149 -0.035 0.050 0.164 0.457 0.161 -0.045 -0.255 -0.090 -0.030
I 0.072 0.000 0.274 0.138 0.642 0.667 0.117 0.146 -0.037 -0.222 -0.025 -0.031
LP 0.039 -0.014 0.019 0.018 0.039 0.029 0.381 0.714 0.003 0.005 -0.110 -0.036
networks on Twitter we show that our proposed metrics can
identify the vulnerable nodes for false news networks with
higher precision.
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